The Self, language and reflexivity: learning processes in Rorty, Habermas and Taylor

Abstract

Starting from the presupposition of the contingency of the subject and of reason, I will try to map responses to “Enlightenment Fundamentalism” and its conceptions of reason and the subject, in the traditions of thought that can be called hermeneutic, concentrating on the “weak hermeneutics” of Richard Rorty, the “critical hermeneutics” of Jürgen Habermas and the “strong hermeneutics” of Charles Taylor, as well as how their analyses ground conceptions of learning. The analysis will expose the problems associated with the attempts of Rorty and Habermas to rethink the possibility of reflective practices, as well as the subject
who engages in them. I will then outline the conception of the subject and of rationality developed by Taylor. I will attempt to show that his “strong hermeneutics” offers a possibility of rethinking the Self and reflection in a way that grounds them both in the material and historical conditions of life, while avoiding extreme forms of both universalism and contextualism. I will end with brief comments about the reflective practices supported by these three varieties of hermeneutics and their implications for educational practice.